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New Patterns of European Migration:
A Broad View from a Multidisciplinary Perspective

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New Patterns of European Migration.
A Broad View from a Multidisciplinary Perspective

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Abstract

The paper offers a perspective on the evolution of migration processes in post-WWII Europe. The concept of “migration cycle” is introduced to provide theoretical underpinnings for the analysis of the often complex relationship between migration and the state. This relationship becomes particularly complex when former net emigration countries transform their (migration) “status” to that of net immigration. Accordingly, three groups of European countries are distinguished in the paper taking into account their experience with inflows of foreign citizens. These are: “mature”, “new” and “future” immigration countries or, respectively, Western, Southern and Central European states.

This process of transformation of European countries from net emigration to net immigration states is analysed from three different perspectives: historical, economical and political. The paper opens with a historical and statistical overview of the past and present migration patterns in Europe and their influence on the changing demographic structure of the continent. Of particular interest are contemporary migration patterns triggered by the recent EU enlargements. The concept of the “fluid migration” as a new trend in the intra-EU mobility is introduced to highlight the changing structure of European migration. Next, the paper takes an economic perspective to analyse the impact of migration processes on both national and European labour markets and demands for welfare state support. It shows that while the political debate on European migration is often coloured by a populist view of immigration, the available studies emphasise the broadly positive long-term influence of migration on (European) host labour markets and welfare state. Finally, the paper takes a political perspective to discuss the variety of national responses of the EU member states to massive migration flows and the development of migration policies at both national and the EU levels.
1. Introduction

Postwar Europe has faced the challenge of transforming itself from an emigration to an immigration region. This process has occurred in different periods of time in particular parts of the continent. Western European countries have been followed by the Southern ones, whereas the issue of when and how this process will be noticeable in Central and Eastern Europe still remains an open question. This transformation has had a powerful impact on every domain of the social, political and economic realm of the receiving states and of Europe as a whole: on demography, the labour market, welfare, politics, the public and the political spheres, the social and the ethnic relations.

The last two decades were a time of dynamic political changes within the European continent, symbolised by the fall of the Iron Curtain and the development of the EU. The latter especially proved to be a crucial factor in building a new European migration space, treated both as an institutional regime within the system of EU law and regulations, and as migration patterns to and within the EU. It has to be noted that what can be regarded as the European migration regime is something absolutely unique and distinct, incomparable in the contemporary world in terms of scale or the legal and institutional framework.

The main aim of this paper is to look, in a multidisciplinary way, at contemporary Europe as a migration space. The first part briefly introduces the concept of the European migration cycle and presents the change of migration patterns within the continent as well as its impact on particular states. The logic of the free movement of labour was a fundamental pillar of EU development. Therefore, to understand the dynamics of migration in Europe, the economic perspective becomes a crucial one. The influence of foreigners’ presence on labour markets and within economies is examined in the second part of the article. To complete the picture the political perspective is also required. The last part focuses on the important issue of migration and integration policy, which is presented in the context of the critical debate on multiculturalism in Europe taking place nowadays.
2. **Old and new patterns of European migration**

It might be argued, taking the long view and using the perspective of the European migration cycle, that a major trait of the present migration in Europe is the shift that almost all the countries seemed to undergo, namely from ‘old’ to ‘new’ relative stability of international movements of people. That change, called the migration transition, involved two principal phenomena: generally increased international mobility and a reversal of migration balance, from negative to positive. European-style modernisation and one of its integral parts, the demographic transition, were among the root causes of systematically growing population movements and ultimately the transformation of individual country ‘status’ from net emigration to net immigration. The timing and magnitude of becoming immigrant-receiving countries is presented in Table 1.

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1 The concept has been extensively discussed in Okólski 2012.
2 For the sake of integrity of this text, while referring to Europe we have in mind the member states of the European Union (and countries that are in some way formally associated with the EU).
Table 1. Ten EU-27 countries with largest foreign population in 2008 and Switzerland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign citizens in 2008</th>
<th>Increase from ‘low’ level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual size (thousand)</td>
<td>share of total population (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (a)</td>
<td>7,255.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,262.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (b)</td>
<td>4,020.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (c)</td>
<td>3,674.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,432.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,602.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>971.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>835.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>688.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>553.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>524.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27 (d)</td>
<td>30,778.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) in 2008 also approximately 2.3-2.5 million foreign-born nationals (‘ethnic Germans’); (b) in 2008 also approximately 2.0 million foreign-born nationals (naturalised immigrants); (c) in 2008 also approximately 2.8 million foreign-born nationals (naturalised immigrants); (d) in 2008, 63.3% of all foreigners in EU-27 were citizens of non-EU states.

Source: Eurostat (for 2008), country statistics (for earlier years)

From the medium-term perspective, however, it seems clear that the migration transition does not occur in the same period in all European countries. Moreover, not all countries change their migration status easily and under similar circumstances. The pioneering state was France followed (in the third quarter of the 20th century) by the majority of northwestern countries. After approximately two decades migration status was transformed in four southern
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and among the ‘northwestern latecomers’ (Finland, Iceland, Ireland). Finally, the beginning of the 21st century witnessed a similar change in some central-eastern countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia). According to their current experience with the inflow of foreign citizens, the three groups of European countries might be called, respectively: ‘mature’, ‘new’ and ‘future’ immigration countries.

In the short-run, migration processes significantly differ across countries (both within each of the three groups and between those groups). They are also sensitive to shocks in the national and international social milieu, and to country-specific migration policies. Changes in population flows triggered by economic turbulence at the outset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) could be seen as one of many illustrations. Some countries immediately experienced a deep decline in the inflow of migrants (e.g. Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy and Ireland); some others experienced hardly any changes (e.g. the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden and Austria); but there were also some where the inflow of migrants strongly intensified (e.g. Portugal and Denmark). Notwithstanding those differences, the continent’s population has already acquired major properties of a migrant population. Of all foreign-born worldwide, 34% live in Europe (20% in the EU). In turn, 19% of all residents of the EU are either non-EU citizens or foreign-born or had parents or grandparents born abroad, and an additional 11% are EU citizens who are returned migrants or have a foreign spouse.

In addition to this rather broad description, at least six distinctive features of the present European migration pattern might be distinguished to grasp its essence. First, the current migration to and from nearly all countries is embedded in centuries-long common European history; in such important events or landmarks as major wars and famines, revolutions and technological breakthroughs; and – last but not least – overseas expansion. This is e.g. why nowadays major groups of immigrants in Portugal are the citizens of Brazil, Cape Verde and Angola and, on the other hand, major destinations for Portuguese emigrants include Angola and Brazil.

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3 Also in Cyprus.
4 This illustration draws from the Eurostat database on new immigrant registrations and refers to 2008 data relative to 2007. In the first group the change was in the range -24% to -43%, in the second -5% to +5%, and in the third +54% and +42%, respectively.
5 Based on the 2008 data (EC 2010).
Second, there is a number of clusters comprising neighbouring countries which display particularly strong intra-regional interdependencies and, thus, form specific migration mini-systems (e.g. Luxembourg and its three surrounding countries: Belgium, France and Germany; the British Isles; the Scandinavian countries; the Balkan countries; and pairs of countries such as France-Italy or Germany-Poland). While those mini-systems are limited to intra-European movements of migrants, they are nevertheless characterised by lasting and intensified flows of people and their rich diversity.

The third of these features links a great part of the present migration to that of the 1950s and 1960s: the era of large-scale recruitment of migrant workers by countries such as the then German Federal Republic. That was the period when noncommunist Europe was sharply divided into migrant receiving and migrant sending countries, when many current strongholds of immigrant communities and migrant networks originated, and when international movements of people were unequivocally perceived as beneficial and highly desirable. Many of the migratory directions, channels and routes established in those years continue to the present day even though the forms of flows might have changed.

Fourth, European migration plays a vital, and indeed an increasing role in compensating the deficit of natural increase of the population and decelerating its ageing. For decades now the demographic sustainability of several countries (notably Germany) has been underpinned solely or predominantly by strong immigration and, thus, by highly positive migration balance.

Fifth, a large majority of European immigrants come from relatively well-off countries. In 2008, around 73% of the total EU inflow arrived from countries defined as ‘highly developed’ by the UNDP (using a classification based on the HDI\(^6\)).\(^7\) A little more than a half of migrants were the citizens of other EU countries or own citizens (return migrants). Only 10% originated from the UNDP ‘less developed’ countries.\(^8\)

Finally, typical for Europe is a relatively high propensity of its population to emigrate, usually irrespective of whether the migration balance of a given country is positive or negative. In 2008 approximately 2.3 million residents of EU countries were deemed to be emigrants, which means 60 emigrants per 100 immigrants. It is not only in some new EU

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\(^6\) Human Development Index; method refined in 2008.
\(^7\) The share of the population of those countries in the total world population was barely 30%.
\(^8\) Those countries, in turn, contributed in 22% to the total world population.
member states (e.g. Poland and Romania) that the out-migration is sizeable and by far outnumbers the inflows of people, but a high emigration volume (and rate) is also typical for such renowned immigration countries as the United Kingdom.

After the dismantlement of the communist system in Europe and particularly after the two most recent enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, sizeable flows of labour (and also students, business people, and family members) from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the ‘old’ countries of the European Community became a new and indeed overwhelming tendency. Out of 3.8 million immigrants recorded in 2008 more than one million originated from the former European communist countries. The CEE member states of the EU-27 accounted for around 60% of intra-EU population movements (20% of all inflows) while the share of non-EU post-communist countries (notably Albania, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova) in immigration to the EU was also significant (6-7%). In addition, citizens of CEE countries were highly represented among other categories of migrants, such as short-term circular migrants (seasonal workers in particular) and irregular migrants (usually the overstaying ‘tourists’).

In contrast to the pre-1974 period when the inflow of temporary migrants (guest workers) predominated, and the 1974-1988 when settlement migration with the purpose of family reunion was prominent, the new pattern of migration in Europe is characterised by a strong diversity of flow forms and migrant activities and strategies. Two newly emerged forms of population movements considerably added to that diversity: ‘incomplete’ and ‘fluid’ migration.

Incomplete migration is a trans-border circular mobility of the residents of the CEE countries that originally was a response to the limited freedom of their international movements and, especially, restricted access to the labour markets in the well-off countries of the West. The major form of international movement available to them was tourism (in fact,

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9 The top ten source countries were Romania, Poland, Morocco, China, India, Bulgaria, Germany, Albania, Ukraine and Italy (EC 2010).

10 It should be added that major European flows in late 1980s and the early 1990s were those of asylum seekers. It was estimated that over 3.5 million foreigners entered Western Europe between 1989 and 1994 seeking either refugee status or temporary protection of whom 1.3-1.4 million originated from non-European countries. In turn, since the mid-1990s, the inflow of illegal migrants of non-European origin (often assisted by specialised networks of people smugglers) has come to the fore. For an extensive account of various forms of the population movements in Europe in the second half of the 20th century see Okólski (1999).
‘false tourism’)\(^{11}\) and its main causes were the East-West differences in wage rates and quality-adjusted relative prices of consumer goods. Since wages were significantly higher in western countries and the quality of “western” consumer durables much higher, it became rational and highly profitable for travellers from the East to make/earn money in the West and spend it on personal imports of western consumer durables and consumption of cheap local products in their home countries (Okólski 2001). The ‘incompleteness’ on the one hand succeeded many characteristics of commuting for work, which in the communist era substituted for a great part (of thus avoided) urbanisation-related migration in many CEE countries, and on the other hand embodied a syndrome of transnationality, social bivalence\(^{12}\) and split life (earning money in one country and having a household in another) of migrants.

In view of the abovementioned restrictions the intensity of ‘incomplete migration’ flows was strongly related to the passport policies of individual CEE countries, whereas the duration of stay in target countries depended on tourist visa policies in the latter. Generally, incomplete migration involved short stay and various irregular economic activities (e.g. petty trade, informal employment) in the host countries. Such a form of mobility was pioneered by the citizens of Poland who already in the 1980s had enjoyed, compared to other communist countries, a rather large degree of freedom of movement of people as tourists. In the 1990s, when the movements of the CEE population became massive, incomplete migration came to be the main form of mobility in several countries of the region (e.g. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Ukraine). After 2004 it ceased to be popular in countries (notably in Poland) that (thanks to their accession to the EU) were granted free or liberalised access to the labour markets in the West.

At about the same time a new form of mobility has emerged – fluid (liquid) migration. This was due to three major factors. The first was the IT-led revolution in mass telecommunications, which substantially reduced the cost of remaining in regular contact with family and friends back home, and the development of cheap and effective transportation networks, that greatly reduced the real cost of air travel and, thus, allowed migrants to visit their home country more frequently. The second was the substantially increased mobility of people in CEE that ensued from the vast and comprehensive social changes ignited by the

\(^{11}\) Migrants involved in this form of flows were entering a destination country on the basis of tourist visa (usually valid for three months) but the only (or principal) intention of their arrival and stay was irregular employment or other kind of activity in the shadow economy.

\(^{12}\) Social bivalence denotes a specific self-identity of migrant who tends to perceive of himself/herself as belonging to two different cultural milieux – of sending and receiving society (Łukowski 2001).
collapse of communism and transition to liberal democracy and the market economy. The third factor was high demand for labour in the rich economies of the EU, which between 2004 and 2011 opened their labour markets, in some cases instantly and in others gradually, to the citizens of newly incorporated EU member states.

The fluid form of migration is, thus, typical of migrants who originate from eight CEE countries which accessed the EU in 2004. The epitome trait of fluid migration is its volatility. It differs from earlier forms of large-scale migration in Europe as it combines six major characteristics (Engbersen 2012). First, it is mostly temporary and hence relatively rarely leads to permanent settlement and full integration of migrants. Second, the predominant motive for migration is economic, specifically gainful employment or an opportunity to advance one’s professional career. Third, migration tends to be legal with migrants as a rule fully documented throughout the migration process or at least in possession of work permits. Fourth, migrants do not necessarily follow traditional routes nor they aim at traditional destinations; they choose new receiving regions and countries as well as moving between various (multiple) destinations. Fifth, it represents a purely first-generation pattern of migration; migrants are usually single persons and follow individual strategies. Sixth, it assumes an ‘intentional unpredictability’ of migrants’ aspirations and behaviours; at any time migrants, as a rule, keep various options open.

In general, fluid migration involves a high degree of unpredictability, flexibility, temporariness and circularity. In addition, due to those characteristics, it often fails to meet the basic criteria of migration that are in official use, what makes liquid migration to a large extent ‘invisible’ in official statistics.

3. European migration: an economic perspective

3.1 Immigration to Europe and demography

After several decades of an almost continuous inflow of immigrants13 the numbers of foreign-born people in Europe have reached levels so high by European standards that they have triggered a new wave of public discussions on the costs and benefits of immigrants’ presence in Western European countries. The late 1980s and 1990s saw an escalation of anti-immigrant

13 In most cases initiated by the demand-driven recruitment of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s.
rhetoric triggered by a spectacular increase in the proportion of foreign-born in the total population and, in particular, by the so-called ‘asylum crisis’ and the large scale of irregular migration. In response, most of the Western European governments have attempted to apply stricter controls over the inflow of newcomers, including asylum seekers. All these phenomena can easily be summarised by two concepts continuously present in the European public debate on migration: the ‘zero immigration policy’ and the ‘fortress Europe’ (Castles and Miller 1993).

The 1990s brought a new important dimension into the immigration debate. Contrary to earlier expectations (e.g. the activity of the Club of Rome),\textsuperscript{14} the dynamics of demographic changes made it increasingly apparent that the future of European societies will be dramatically shaped by low fertility rates and, thus, the ageing population. The projected increase in the share of the (economically non-active) elderly in the population and decrease in the related labour market support ratios raise the question of how these ageing societies are to sustain economic growth and support their elderly at the same time and what political responses to these developments are likely to emerge.

One of the most discussed issues is the potential (positive) impact of immigration, the so-called ‘replacement migration’. This issue has been persuasively addressed by the influential 2001 UN report on migration’s impact on demographic structures (UN 2001). On the basis of detailed forecasts, the authors projected a severe decline in the population of most well developed countries, accompanied by significant changes in the age structure and labour market support ratios. ‘Replacement migration’ was then analysed as a possible remedy. However, considering the recent trends in migration and the observed decline in immigrants’ fertility as they integrate into the social fabric of host societies, immigration cannot offer a long-term solution to the demographic problems of the well-developed world. The UN report shows that very high and sustained inflows of immigrants would be needed to maintain the size of the total in-country population and, in particular, the constant ratio between the working age population and those of non-working age. Such a perspective – particularly scenarios assuming massive inflows of newcomers – is hardly acceptable from either the social or the political point of view.

\textsuperscript{14} The Club of Rome is an international think-tank founded in 1968 with an aim of identifying and dealing with most crucial issues faced by humanity now and in the future. Demographic issues played an important role in the first phase of the Club’s activity with an emphasis on overpopulation as a barrier to growth.
Nonetheless, even if the prospect of ‘replacement migration’ remains vague and unrealistic, an inflow of newcomers could serve as a source of demographic dynamism in the short- and/or medium-term and, in particular, it could help to alleviate some labour market pressures. OECD (2011) shows that net migration constituted a significant portion of the total population change in most EU countries, especially in the new immigration magnets such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (OECD 2011). If net migration was zero or negative, most of the EU member countries (with the exception of France, Ireland and the United Kingdom) would experience a severe decline in their working-age population over the coming decades. As shown by Fargues (2011), while immigration is not the only solution (an inflow of immigrants is expected to improve labour market support ratios in the short term but in the longer term the ageing of the foreign-born will increase the number of elderly people), it is a necessary component of any policy mix aiming to address the impact of demographic changes in Europe.

3.2 Foreigners and the EU labour market

As noted above, during the few postwar decades immigrants became a structural component of most EU labour markets, often accounting for at least 10-15% of the total labour force. Not surprisingly, immigrants’ presence and the scale of their participation in the labour market became one of the most important issues in the immigration debate.

In most cases the role and influence of foreign labour are presented in a highly stereotyped, biased and deliberately controversial way. It is commonly argued that immigrants compete with native workers on the domestic labour market and thus the influx of foreigners reduces the number of jobs available for native workers, (the crowding out effect) which increases the risk of unemployment for the natives, creates downward pressure on wages, and leads to the so-called ‘social dumping’ (deteriorating in-country working standards). Thus, immigrants are commonly blamed for negative swings in the EU economies, and a liberal approach towards immigration and migration policies is hardly acceptable during economic downturns. Such attitudes are widespread in the media and increasingly used by populist and/or right-wing political parties to rally anti-migrant sentiment, particularly at the time of economic stagnation or recession.
However, such beliefs are at variance with both the economic theory and the available empirical evidence. Most economic models dealing with adjustment mechanisms in labour markets question the negative impact of newcomers. Only a very basic model assuming perfect flexibility and competitiveness (e.g. no rigidities on the labour market, including impact of trade unions or minimum wages) and homogeneity of the labour market supply shock in the form of an additional inflow of foreign labour projects a decrease of wages. Under such assumptions, no unemployment appears and the total effect is absorbed by a change in the wage level. In more advanced approaches, the net outcome of immigration is strongly conditional on such issues as the structure of the labour market (particularly the existence of the so-called primary and secondary sectors – Piore 1979), market rigidities (e.g. a state intervention in the form of a minimum wage), and, in particular, complementarity/substitution between the native and the foreign labour force (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999). Additionally, such effects as the process of job creation driven by the immigrants’ consumption or ethnic economy should be taken into account.

For these reasons, the effects of migration on the receiving labour market are commonly inferred from empirical studies rather than posed as a theoretical question. A large number of empirical studies related to the US labour market (Borjas et al. 1996, Card 2004) show the impact of immigrants on the employment opportunities of domestic workers to be moderate or negligible. The ‘Mariel flow’, i.e. a massive inflow of Cuban immigrants to the Miami area recorded in 1989, is presented as one of the best examples. As shown by Card (1990), even such a massive supply shock (accounting for around 7% of the labour force) did not impact adversely on the local and regional labour market (except for Cubans alone who suffered from the increased “ethnic” competition). In most cases, however, the picture is more complex as there are adverse effects of immigration on vulnerable groups of domestic workers such as the young or those poorly educated.

European labour markets are usually described as far more rigid and less flexible than the American one. Nevertheless, even in this case, most studies provide similar results to those presented above. For example, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) concluded, on the basis of a simulation, that in the case of the German labour market, the inflow of foreign labour brought gains for the whole economy and that sectoral effects strongly depended on the structure of
the newcomers (low skilled/highly skilled immigrant labour). Boeri and Brücker (2000) have shown the elasticities of wages and (un)employment with respect to immigrant labour to be relatively low and the cumulative effects of the inflow of foreign workers small and largely insignificant (with the exception of the aforementioned sectoral effects).

3.3. Immigration and the welfare state

Among the wide range of issues related to immigration and its economic effects, the impact of foreigners on the welfare systems is probably the most controversial (which, to some extent, can be explained by the continuous crisis of European welfare models). Immigrants are commonly blamed for relying on public welfare and social services, and being a burden for state budgets. Moreover, this kind of belief is often implicit in migration policies of countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, which seriously restrict or delay access to social benefits for the citizens of the EU8 countries which accessed the EU in 2004 (see section 3.4).

Unfortunately, available empirical studies provide only mixed results. This refers to both the United States (UNDP 2009) and the European countries, particularly Germany (Riphahn 2004, Castronova et al. 2001). The Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom represent two opposite examples. In the former, most of the available studies show a relatively larger scale of net welfare consumption by immigrants than by non-migrants (e.g. Storesletten 2003, Nannestad 2004). In the latter, the available data show positive and significant contributions of immigrants to the treasury and net fiscal gains for the British economy, particularly in the post-accession period (Pollard et al. 2008).

The general inference, however, is similar to that presented in the previous section. The available empirical evidence shows the net fiscal impacts of immigration to be small or moderate (in most cases oscillating between -1 to 1% of the receiving country’s GDP) and, thus, can hardly explain negative attitudes towards the inflow of foreigners. What is more, the comparison of the fiscal effects of the inflow in such countries as the United Kingdom and the

15 Interestingly, the net gain for the German economy was positive in both cases but higher in the case of low-skilled immigration. This effect is explained by the complementarities between relatively better educated native (German) workers and less skilled foreigners entering mostly secondary sectors of the German economy.
Scandinavian countries suggests that the net impact depends on a complex set of factors including the structure of immigration, the efficiency of migrant integration in the labour market and, most importantly, the welfare regime itself (e.g. the generosity of the system which may lead to welfare dependency). Generally, better education of immigrants translates into higher labour market participation rates and more positive impacts on fiscal balance at destinations. Nevertheless, immigrants are often blamed for problems resulting from market failures or inefficiency of the welfare system in receiving countries.

3.4. EU enlargement as a ‘natural experiment’?

While the recent debate on immigration in Europe is hardly based on a solid theoretical reasoning or supported by empirical evidence, most available studies emphasise the potentially positive impact of the inflow on the labour market, the welfare state and demographic structures.

Against this background, the last two EU enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007 may serve as a perfect exemplification of previously expressed ideas and as a kind of ‘natural experiment’. Importantly, they were unprecedented for a number of reasons. Firstly, the differences in income levels and living conditions were perceived as being much greater than in the case of previous accessions, particularly the 1980s round when Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EU. Secondly, nearly all the new member countries (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta) were still in the process of the post-communist socio-economic transition and some of them had faced serious barriers to mobility in the past and had not experienced massive migration prior to the EU enlargement (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009). Thirdly, the scale of change also matters: the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement rounds increased the number of EU citizens by around 25% (as compared to merely 20% in the 1980s) – see Table 2.
Table 2. EU’s accession rounds and their impacts on the size of population of the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accession year</th>
<th>New member states</th>
<th>No. of EU member states (after enlargement)</th>
<th>Number of new EU citizens (in thous.)</th>
<th>% change of number of citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64,228</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9,701</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Spain, Portugal</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48,515</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Austria, Finland, Sweden</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21,859</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Romania</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29,244</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on EUROSTAT data*

Prior to 2004 it was feared that accession could trigger unsustainable inflows of migrants from new member countries to the EU15. As a consequence, most of the EU15 countries introduced transitional periods (up to seven years in the case of Austria and Germany), which seriously restricted access of Poles and other citizens of the new EU member states to the EU15 labour markets. Even Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which opened their labour markets, restricted migrant access to social welfare.16

Nevertheless, the years immediately following enlargement saw an unprecedented increase in the scale of migration from the new member states. According to estimations based on the European Labour Force Survey data the number of foreign residents from the EU817 countries in the EU15 has risen from around 900,000 persons in 2003 to more than 1.9 million in 2007 (0.5% of the receiving population as compared to 0.2% in 2003). This also means that there was a significant increase in the scale of annual flows (250,000) as compared to the pre-accession period (62,000 on average in 2000-2003). The largest outflows were experienced by Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania (Brücker et al. 2009). Fic et al. (2011) estimate the 2009 share of emigrants in the sending population to be as high as 1.8% for the EU8 and 6.3% for the EU2.18 The highest outflows were experienced by Romania (7.3%), Lithuania (4.2%), Bulgaria (3.4%), Latvia (2.5%), Poland (2.4%), and Estonia (2.3%)

16 Interestingly, similar – but much stricter – solutions were applied when Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, with most EU25 countries adopting transitional restrictions on the free movement of workers even if most studies showed rather negative impacts of transitory measures.

17 Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

18 Bulgaria and Romania.
The largest absolute outflows of emigrants in relation to the home population were experienced by Poland and Romania (Brücker et al. 2009).

**Figure 1. EU8 and EU2 emigrants as a percentage of the sending population**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of sending population for various countries.]

*Source:* Own workings based on Fic et al. 2011.

However, the overall increase in migration after 2004, even if massive in absolute terms, remained relatively moderate when compared with the population sizes of both the sending and the receiving countries. The main exceptions were: Ireland and the UK with 4% and 1.2% of the receiving population, respectively, which absorbed mostly migrants from the EU8 countries; and Spain and Italy (1.9% and 1.5%, respectively), which became immigration magnets for the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania (see Figure 2).
Nevertheless, the whole process was exceptionally dynamic and, particularly in the Anglophone countries, completely changed their immigration structures. Within only three or four years, migrants from the new member states became the most important immigrant group in the UK and Ireland, and significant changes were noted in many other countries (Spain, Italy, the Netherlands). In comparison with previous flows, new migrants from the region tend to be male, strongly work-oriented (with labour migrants constituting a vast majority of the total flow), young, and relatively well-educated (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). Given the transitory, transnational and temporary character of these recent flows from CEE we refer to them as ‘fluid migration’ (Black et al. 2010). A relatively large scale and, in particular, unprecedented dynamics of the post-accession flows brings into focus the effects of this phenomenon for both the sending and the receiving countries. In the context of this paper the latter issue is of particular importance. Most of the available studies show a relatively efficient market matching process whereby temporary workers from labour-rich transition countries are absorbed by the labour markets in the ‘old’ EU member states with their permanent and strong demand for labour (especially for less skilled workers). The post-accession migrants to Western Europe tend to have higher labour market participation rates,
higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than the native labour force (as well as the labour force in the sending countries). However, given their skill structure, the problems associated with the transferability of skills (e.g., language competencies) and, in particular, the structure of demand at the destination, these migrants tend to be significantly overrepresented in low and medium skill categories and occupations (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009).

Available macro-level studies shed new light on the aforementioned debate concerning the developmental impacts of migration. Brücker et al. (2009) analysed the impact of EU8 migration between 2004 and 2007 and concluded that the receiving countries significantly gained from the massive post-accession migration flows. The impact was negative or neutral, however, for the sending countries. All in all, the impact on the GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment and wages was rather moderate (in the short-run) and negligible in the long-run, both in the case of the sending as well as receiving countries. In their recent study covering the period 2004-2009 (and thus including the GFC recession phase), Fic et al. (2011) show that Ireland and the United Kingdom, which opened their labour markets for newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe, achieved the highest gains from post-accession migration. The gains for the EU15 economy were moderate but also positive (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3. Macroeconomic impacts of the 2004-2009 (post-accession) migration on the receiving EU15 countries**

![Source: Own workings based on Fic et al. 2011.](source)
‘The natural experiment’ of the EU enlargement may shows that ‘mobile Europe’ is more than a hazy concept. Hundreds of thousands of ‘new Europeans’ embarked on their migration journeys in search of better jobs and living conditions. This process of intra-European migration has largely been demand-driven. Immigrants are filling gaps in highly fragmented labour markets in destination countries which appear to have benefited relatively more from this process than the sending countries.

4. How nation-states and the EU have responded to the diversity of migration forms? A migration policy perspective

As argued above, Europe as a migration space has faced remarkably diversified forms of migration flows during the previous several decades. Massive postwar migration constructed a new reality with which the nation-states had to be confronted. It was related to serious transitions connected not only to demographic and social change, but also to a fundamental transformation of the understanding of national culture, ethnicity and citizenship.

Immigration brings with it a variety of challenges – to demography, a labour market, an ethnic composition, a social structure, national politics. Whereas a population, an economy, even a legal system and politics are able (in time) to adapt and deal with immigration, its impact on the social and cultural life of a community is arguably the slower, more ambiguous and often controversial. It results in serious tensions, especially in the area of daily interactions between immigrants and members of the host societies.

Nation-states responded to cultural pluralism with various strategies for diversity management. Further a wide range of policies were implemented in time along the policy continuum extending from assimilation and segregation approaches at the one end, to integration and multiculturalism at the other (with many other policy mixes in between). Assimilation pressures exerted on minority groups (both settled and newcomers) to encourage their absorption into the dominant national culture had been a common policy for decades, usually justified by the supreme objective of the national unity and social stability. Postwar immigration together with other global processes (such as decolonisation) brought a significant change in the area of ethnic relations. Since the 1970s, the changes in the states'
approaches towards the acceptance of their own cultural and ethnic diversity have been visible. The pioneering state in Europe was Sweden where the government proclaimed the implementation of a multicultural policy in 1975. Other countries took longer to recognise and officially accept the multicultural diversity of their own societies (e.g. the government of Germany announced just recently that it is a multicultural state) (Boswell 2003; Cornelius 2004; Geddes 2003; Spencer 2003).

The policy of multiculturalism is based on perceiving the diversity of the cultural traditions of ethnic and religious communities as a (social) value, which should not only be recognised and accepted, but also actively fostered by the state. Thus, it makes it incumbent on the state to provide institutional structure and support to protect and develop the cultural diversity of migrant communities through, for instance, migrant education in the language of their mother country, increasing the media awareness of cultural diversity, making school curricula foster multicultural awareness of pupils and students, or by facilitating the translation of official documents into minority (group) languages.

Most of the European states developed different ‘philosophies of integration’ based on differing traditions, concepts of community, citizenship and nationhood (Brubaker 1989; Favell 2001; Ireland 2004), and implemented various models of integration policies addressed at immigrants. In very general terms, for instance, the French model of integration could be described as a ‘republican’ one. It sees integration as an ongoing process at the end of which ethnic differences are expected to disappear as migrants are integrated into the French community via expansive naturalisation. The German model represents a ‘social’ model of integration where labour market and welfare state membership is recognised as a vehicle for integration. The model implemented in the United Kingdom seems to be the closest to the classic ‘multicultural’ model. Based on the concept of a ‘community of communities’ where cultural and ethnic diversity is recognised as a value, it was partly an inheritance of colonial traditions and the idea of the British Commonwealth. In a similar way the Swedish, Dutch or Spanish models of integration policy could be distinguished. To understand their logic, it is necessary to look deeper into the history of each country, its traditions and ideas of community, nationhood and citizenship, as well as to take into account the unique national context in which immigration emerged.

Also, the contemporary politics of migration and integration in Europe cannot be understood without taking into account the dynamics of both migration and mobility and the
role the EU now plays in managing both. As immigration has always been a sensitive issue and given a strong, traditional commitment to national sovereignty, EU member states have been reluctant to cede their authority in the area of the management of human flows from a national government to a supranational authority. Although there is evidence of policy convergence in the EU – shared objectives, common legal instruments and a highly developed decision-making process – it does not mean that there is a common EU approach to managing migration. Nevertheless, the harmonisation process has been noticeable in various domains, such as external border protection, the visa policy, the asylum regime and steps taken to combat illegal migration.

What has to be stressed here, is that Europe is not a homogenous migration space; contrary, its rich diversity in terms of migration profiles of particular countries has to be taken into account. It is difficult (and even impossible) to compare such states as the UK, France or Germany (with numerous populations of immigrants and a several-generation history of immigration) with Poland or Hungary (with less than 1% of settled foreigners). Whereas the former are countries with a long-lasting tradition of immigration and an intensive debate concerning dealing with a multicultural community, the latter are at the beginning of the transformation into emigration-immigration countries, with small foreigner inflows, where immigration, not to mention integration or multiculturalism, is not the subject of any public or political debate.

Moreover, this diversification is also noticeable within one state. There is a (sometimes huge) gap between policies implemented in different regions or cities due to the fact that the character of the inflows, as well as the social and economic profile of immigrants, may be different in peripheral regions than, say, the capital cities. Especially in more politically and administratively decentralised countries, such as Germany or Spain, local authorities are also able to develop their own approach to implementing an integration policy.

In such a multilevel model of (migration) policy implementation and given the territorial dispersion of immigrants, the principle of subsidiarity could be a solution. It is based on a premise that a political decision-making system should be taken as close as possible to the governed to ensure that the decisions are well-tailored to their needs and perceived by them as indispensable. The EU provides the guidelines, a set of basic concepts and the general rules, which should be implemented by the member states in an agreed
manner by having these guidelines transposed, via the so-called open method of coordination, into national and regional policies.

The main tenets of EU migration or integration policies are: first, the right to movement for EU citizens supported by a highly developed free-movement framework. Free movement (initially introduced for workers) was envisaged by the 1957 Treaty of Rome and was strictly related to the economic impetus underpinning European integration. In time, third-country citizens (TCNs) and refugees were included into the free movement framework. That was the beginning of the EU’s migration regime development, institutionalised further in the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties.

Second, the single market concept, which underpins the logic behind EU migration and integration policy. Prioritising the economy and the labour market needs is the main reason for the EU’s involvement in migration (and integration) policies. As a result, the EU integration policy is focused mainly on legal aspects (focused on admission rules, status of stay and work, scope of rights and obligations of foreigners, both EU citizens and third country nationals), while its cultural component is almost absent. Moreover, comparing integration with other main issues constituting the EU migration policy (such as external border protection, tackling illegal migration or asylum policy), it is still relatively less developed and conceptualised at a general level.

Third, the priority of anti-discrimination legislation. The normative fundamentals are created by two Directives introduced in 2000 (the Race Equality Directive and the Equal Treatment Directive, both aimed at combating discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity in employment, social protection and the provision of services); and the 2003 Directive on the rights of long-term residents (which extends to legally resident TCNs making their rights equivalent to those of EU citizens after five years of legal residence). These documents play a crucial role, they are binding and must be implemented by all member states. Anti-discrimination legislation is well developed at both the EU and national levels. However, its translation into daily practice still remains a great challenge.

Fourth, the concept of integration. Defined formally as a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by the migrants and the residents of the member states.¹⁹ It means that

managing integration is a responsibility shared by both sides: migrant newcomers and members of the host society. A socio-economic approach to integration was introduced by the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. They were agreed upon by the EU Council in 2004, and underlined the primary role of education, work, housing and health as the areas of successful integration.²⁰

The EU itself does not deliver integration. It rather provides a rights-based framework that enables mobility and the portability of rights and entitlements within a single market area. EU legislation does not change the content of national integration policies, but provides an important context in which they are developed. This context is a common general legal and political framework, based on an obligatory *acquis* and a collection of recommendations and best practices which all the countries should follow (via the already-mentioned open method of coordination scheme). In other words, the directives from the EU give relatively general pointers and their task is to encourage policy convergence.

Among the main challenges mentioned in EU documents concerning the integration of immigrants the most important ones include: low employment levels of migrants, especially of migrant women; rising unemployment and high levels of 'over-qualification'; increasing risks of social exclusion; gaps in educational achievement; and public concerns about the lack of integration of migrants. Taking these issues into account, the proposed actions are to focus on three main areas: integration through participation (in the labour market or in the education and training system), actions focused on the local administrative level (focused particularly on disadvantaged urban areas and aimed at improving multi-level cooperation between different levels of government), and the involvement of the countries of origin (e.g. to facilitate future integration before the migrants’ departure from home countries, to support contacts between diaspora communities and their countries of origin, to promote circular migration, and to prepare the migrants’ temporary or definitive return to country of origin).²¹

The migration, and especially the integration, policies seem to fluctuate over time. In periods of economic growth and social stability governments are more willing to implement liberal legislation, and societies are more willing to accept newcomers. The opposite occurs at the time of economic downturns and insecurity. This has been evident in Europe (and all over the world) during the GFC when critical voices against immigration and multiculturalism

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became more prominent. Within a few months at the end of 2010 and 2011, leading European politicians, such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the British Prime Minister David Cameron, made very forward and strong statements, which fuelled the debate about, and arguably strengthened the sentiment against, multiculturalism in Europe. There appear to be two main lines of argument shaping the debate around immigration and integration in the European media and in political and public spheres: (1) that immigration is a threat to public security, and (2) that multiculturalism is incompatible with social cohesion.

The tone of the debate on immigrant integration has changed significantly in recent years: the belief that multiculturalism, by promoting the value of cultural diversity, brings positive effects to the social integrity of host communities has been diminished. The common fear of a threat coming from the outside and from already present immigrants, sustained by the media and some of the political elites, has a powerful impact on this shift towards an anti-immigration and an anti-multiculturalism debate. The association between immigration and security has been increasingly highlighted in public rhetoric.

A debate over the failure of policy to secure immigrant integration tends to be the main public policy concern recently and it is focused particularly on Muslim communities. Muslims are accused of self-segregation, shutting themselves in closed neighbourhoods, living in parallel communities that are openly hostile to their host countries’ cultures and laws, in inner cities. Some commentators doubt that the integration of these communities is at all possible as the cultural differences are regarded as too pronounced. What seems to be rather ironic, in the context of the common concerns about the erosion of social capital and lack of social cohesion in European and other societies, Muslims are accused of having too much bonding capital. Strong religious identity, a lower level of integration to host societies, the role of the traditional sharia law (as remaining above the state law), a common fear of radicalisation, alienation, and violence among (especially young) Muslims led to the situation when the debate around immigration and integration in public media focused on the triad: security-terrorism-Islam.

Recent anti-immigrant sentiment and a backlash against multiculturalism within European societies stems from frustration and concern over the demographic change and the increasing cultural diversity brought about by migration inflows on the one hand, and the economic crisis on the other. It produces a challenge for national governments and EU bodies
as well: how to combine the declining support of host societies for multicultural policies, and
the growing need to implement more effective policies facilitating the immigrants’
sociopolitical and cultural integration.

5. Concluding remarks

In the last few decades most EU countries underwent a significant change from being net
(migrant) sending areas into net receiving areas. This process, described above as the
migration cycle, was deeply rooted in a broad socio-economic context including such
phenomena as a demographic transition or modernisation. As shown in the first section of this
paper, the dynamics of these processes had a serious impact on the migration status of
particular European countries and are still, to a large extent, responsible for the diverse
migration profiles of EU countries.

As a consequence, Europe has become a continent of immigration and the destination
for more than one-third of the world-wide population of foreign-born. Nowadays, in most EU
countries immigrants constitute significant shares of the total population as well as of the
labour force. In structural terms, most of the immigration can be classified as permanent
(contrary to the 1950-1970 recruitment period facilitating short-term movements). However,
due to loopholes in migration policies, cheaper and widely accessible telecommunications and
international transportation, and, thus, the changing balance of cost and benefits for would-be
migrants, new forms of migration appeared. The best example is the so-called liquid
migration characterised by the temporaryness, circularity and flexibility of migratory flows.

Due to the relatively massive presence of foreigners in European societies,
immigration has become one of the most important topics in the public debate. One of the
main aims of this paper was to juxtapose common beliefs and stereotypical knowledge on the
immigrants’ impact against the available empirical evidence. The studies which have been
discussed here demonstrate that an inflow of foreigners does not offer an ultimate solution to
demographic ageiing but may help to overcome short- and medium-term labour market
shortages. Contrary to commonly expressed and widely shared opinions, immigration to EU
countries has not been harmful to their labour markets, nor to their welfare state. As an
exemplification of this thesis the ‘natural experiment’ of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement rounds was presented. This process, massive in terms of population changes as well as migration flows, turned out to be highly beneficial particularly for those EU countries which applied immigration-friendly policies.

Nonetheless, the inflow of foreigners confronts EU societies with a variety of other challenges, including the ethnic composition, social cohesion and social structures, and national politics, whereas the effects of immigration on the social and cultural daily life of receiving communities still remains a highly controversial issue. The paper looked at diverse forms / modes of the immigrants’ incorporation into EU societies. In this context, the rise and fall of the European version of multiculturalism is particularly prominent. It appears that EU immigration and integration policies are strongly related to swings in the European economy and thus seem to develop in cyclical fashion. Additionally, well developed EU countries seem to be confronted with a ‘liberal paradox’ (see Hollifield et al. 2008): in order to remain competitive in the globalising world they need to open their economies to migrants to meet their labour market needs, but at the same time security reasons as well as internal political forces push them towards increased closeness and protectionism.
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