What have we learned about constitutional design in deeply divided societies over the last quarter of a century?

In the aftermath of the end of the cold war, constitutional transitions in South Africa (1994), Bosnia (1995), Fiji (1997), Northern Ireland (1998) and Iraq (2005) aimed at ameliorating ethnic conflict, fostering resilient democracy and achieving political stability. This paper asks what these cases teach us about suitable constitutional arrangements for divided societies. The first part examines the debates between so-called ‘centripetalist’, ‘consociationalist’ and ‘integrationist’ political scientists, and the extent to which institutions adopted in the five case studies conform to these approaches. The second part considers three critical questions about the impact of constitutional design in deeply divided societies: who was responsible; who benefitted; and what were the long-term repercussions.

Jon Fraenkel is a Professor in Comparative Politics in the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. He formerly worked at the Australian National University (2007-12) and the University of the South Pacific in Fiji (1995-2007). He is author of The Manipulation of Custom; from uprising to intervention in the Solomon Islands and co-editor of The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji; A coup to end all coups? He is the Pacific Islands correspondent for The Economist.