Seminar 19
Date:  11 November, 2014
Time: 4 - 5.15pm
Venue: Building 24, Copland, Room 1171, LJ Hume Centre

Speaker:  Charles Miller received his PhD in political science from Duke University in 2013. He is currently revising his dissertation ‘Destructivity: A Political Economy of Military Effectiveness in Conventional Combat’ for publication as a book. His recent publications include ‘Prediction and Its Discontents: Lessons for Australia from the Debate on Social Science Forecasting’ and ‘Re-examining the Australian Public’s Attitude towards Military Casualties: Post Heroic or Defeat Phobic?’

Paper Title:  Destructivity: Principal-Agent Theory at War

Paper Abstract:  In this paper, I use a methodological individualist, principal agent framework to understand the dynamics of armies at war. I model an army as a principal-agent relationship between superiors and subordinates. The superior ‘contracts’ the subordinates to achieve military goals, but can observe only the outcome of the operation not the level of effort and risk undertaken by the subordinates. The subordinates in turn have strong incentives to ‘shirk’, especially by taking fewer personal risks than the superior would prefer. This shirking can, however, take numerous forms and subordinates can substitute amongst different types of shirking as their relative attractiveness changes. Superiors in turn have numerous strategies from which to choose in the event of anticipated shirking, which can include demanding lower effort and concealing subordinate shirking from his or her own superiors. I conclude by outlining some of the circumstances under which we are likely to observe the different shirking strategies and counters on the part of superiors and suggest empirical tests.