Inclusive negotiations between different segments of society are rare in Turkish constitutional history. However, between 2011 and 2013 the country made an attempt that diverged from this pattern. The Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC), consisted of three representatives from each of the four political parties represented in Parliament, and required full consensus between them. However, the process broke down after two years. Among the most likely underlying issues causing the failure of the process are the persisting political and social cleavages in Turkish society, yet how these played into the failure of the process remains understudied. Recognizing the links between political violence, democratic backsliding, and polarization, I explore the role that violence and repression following party cleavages played in undermining the parties’ willingness to make concessions to one another. Understanding what factors shape the propensity of parties to make concessions to one another in constitution-making is essential to understanding the possibility of, as well as the challenges toward, reaching democratic consensus. I propose that having representatives of political parties divided along conflict lines as negotiators exacerbates the role of violence and backsliding through the dilemma of dual responsibility: the representatives needed to consider both the aim of reaching consensus in the negotiations and the electoral interests of their parties. I draw on unique empirical material consisting of complete transcripts from the inter-party negotiations, as well as in-depth interviews with 25 high-level individuals with insights into the process. The findings offer policy recommendations to constitution-makers in divided societies.

Dr. Gudlaug Olafsdottiris a PhD Candidate at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University in Sweden. Her compilation dissertation broadly investigates electoral violence and how it influences democratization. Her research hones in on how citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and elections are affected by electoral violence, and how electoral violence influences and is influenced by constitutional reform. Prior to starting her PhD, Gudlaug worked in the VIEWS research team at Uppsala University using statistical methods to forecast conflict risk across Africa and coded electoral violence across the world for the DECO project. Her work has been published in Environmental Reserach Letters and the Journal of Peace Research, as well as in one of Women In International Security’s policy brief series. She has also briefly worked at the headquarters of International IDEA in Stockholm, done consultancy for the Dag Hammarskjöld foundation, and has been seconded by Sweden as an election observer in three OSCE election monitoring missions.