In open-list proportional representation (OLPR) systems, candidates must obtain personal votes to succeed. A general expectation about these systems is that these rules induce intraparty competition and, ultimately, lead to weak political parties. Recent work has challenged this view, suggesting that intraparty competition in OLPR, even under very permissive conditions, is in fact constrained. |
José Antonio Cheibub (Ph.D. University of Chicago) is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He joined Pitt in 2023 and has previously taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, where he was the Boeschenstein Professor in Public Policy and Political Economy, and Texas A&M University, where he was the Mary Thomas Marshall Professor in Liberal Arts. His research focuses on democratisation, the emergence and effects of specific democratic institutions, and political economy. Currently, he is engaged in projects pertaining to electoral strategies under open-list proportional representation systems, electoral personalism, political instability in Latin America, caretaker administrations in parliamentary democracies, and the effect of anti-majoritarian institutions on economic outcomes.
Location
Speakers
- Professor Jose Antonio Cheibub (University of Chicago)
Contact
- Richard Frank