This paper contributes two arguments to the growing election violence literature. First, it posits that election violence is more likely to be a strategic decision made by political elites, and as such these actors have incentives to threaten violence before actually using it. Second, it explores how both the incumbent government and opposition groups strategically respond in kind to opponents’ actions. This interaction helps explain how spiraling violence seen from Kenya to Bangladesh is driven by the threats and actions of both the incumbent and the political opposition. Data from 194 countries covering the years from 1979 to 2012 are analyzed to empirically test hypotheses about violent threats and reciprocal violence. Results suggest that threats often precede election violence and can lead to violent reprisals.

Dr Richard Frank  received his PhD from Binghamton University in 2009. Prior to joining ANU, he was a research fellow and manager of the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney and an assistant professor at the University of New Orleans. Dr Frank’s research centers on the domestic effects of international politics and the causes of election integrity, electoral violence, civil conflict, and human trafficking.